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INTRODUCTION
School is a place where students are expected to learn and become
prepared to enter the outside world. It is not a cocoon for young people
to be protected from the realities they will inevitably face. It is in this
spirit that dress codes, especially as they relate to young girls in public
schools, should be reexamined by the courts.
Toward the beginning and end of the school year in the United
States, the weather is often quite hot. Many schools require students to
sit outside during lunch or spend time outdoors for physical education.1
As a result, boys and girls alike often choose to wear clothing that will
keep them cool. Most will not don apparel considered inappropriate by
reasonable standards; most students wear clothing purchased for them
by their parents and are likely not allowed to leave their homes for
school if their parents disapprove of their clothing choice.2 Within this
reality, public school dress codes often seek to create another layer of
protection for students, encouraging appropriate dress in order to keep
students focused on education and not what others are wearing. But,
lurking within this very noble goal lies the very real threat of
suppressing students’ basic rights of expression and, even more
frequently, a perpetuation of archaic sexist standards.
As the law currently stands, both in California and at the federal
level, a female student challenging sexist dress code practices stands
little to no chance of success in court. When a fourteen-year-old girl is
taken out of class and told to change her clothes because her shoulders
are exposed or that five inches of her leg above the knee is exposed
instead of the acceptable four, she deserves to have the opportunity to
challenge it. This practice is all too common throughout the nation3,
1. This author attended a public high school in California where temperatures in
September and May were regularly over ninety degrees, and all students were required to sit
outside during lunchtime, where shade from trees or buildings was scarce.
2. This certainly is not true for all public school students, but hopefully serves to
illustrate a typical case.
3. E.g. Brenda Álvarez Girls Fight Back Against Gender Bias in School Dress Codes,
NEA TODAY, January 6, 2016,
http://neatoday.org/2016/01/06/school-dress-codes-gender-bias/; Li Zhou, The Sexism of
School Dress Codes, THE ATLANTIC, October 20, 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-areproblematic/410962/;
Gabrielle Sorto Student Protests Growing Over Gender-Equal Dress Codes, CNN, February
25, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/living/dress-code-protests-irpt/;
Soraya Chemaly, Every Reason Your School’s Gendered Dress Code is Probably a Sexist
Mess, THE HUFFINGTON POST, September 25, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/every-reason-yourschools_b_8147266.html; Jessica Valenti, Are Prudish School Dress Codes Targeting Girls
in Violation of Discrimination Laws?, ALTERNET, September 17, 2014,
http://www.alternet.org/gender/are-prudish-school-dress-codes-targeting-girls-violation-
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and even in California, where gender discrimination is given stronger
treatment than at the federal level. The law should be an equalizer, yet
it cannot accomplish that task when precedent dictates that a court will
not even reach the merits in a case such as this.
This paper will outline the evolution of dress code challenges
through freedom of expression since the 1960s, as well as the
development of gender discrimination challenges, showing how these
two overlapping issues here deserve different treatment by the courts.
This history will be shown through federal law, as well as controlling
law specific to California, due to the difference between California and
federal standards. This paper will then present a proposed presumption
of discrimination for courts to use in cases such as this in order to allow
the greatest efficacy in the legal system. This will allow courts to
review discrimination challenges to dress codes to be reviewed on their
merits, rather than hindered by the current framework of judicial
review.
I.

BACKGROUND

Sexism in dress codes involves two interrelated constitutional
issues: freedom of expression under the First Amendment,4 and equal
protection. Equal protection is treated under both the Fourteenth
Amendment5 and the California constitution.6 The development of the
law in each of these areas will be discussed in turn.
A.

Freedom of Expression

When clothing choice becomes an issue, the first concern most
people would have involves freedom of expression; free speech
through the First and Fourteenth Amendments protects the right to
express yourself in whatever way you choose.7 But this right is not
absolute. The Supreme Court has put a number of limits on what
speech qualifies as protected.8 The Court has not specifically addressed
dress codes in schools since the 1969 in the landmark case Tinker v.
discrimination-laws.
4. U.S. Const. amend. I.
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
6. Cal. Const. art. I §§ 11, 21.
7. The First Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requiring the state governments, which regulate public schools in each state, to
comply with First Amendment protections. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. For example, hate speech and obscenity are not protected by the First Amendment.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (regarding the permissible punishment of
‘fighting words’ under the First Amendment); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) (detailing the test of what constitutes ‘obscene material’ unprotected by the First
Amendment).
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Des Moines County Independent School District.9
In December of 1965, John Tinker and a few of his friends
planned to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam
War.10 The administrators of the school told them that if they indeed
did as they planned, they would be asked to leave school until they
returned without the armbands.11 Tinker sued the school district for
violating his First Amendment right to free speech.12 The Supreme
Court found that the armbands they were wearing in order to protest the
war were akin to “pure speech” in that they were symbolic of the
message they sought to convey, therefore falling under the protection
of the First Amendment.13
Further, because neither students nor teachers shed their
Constitutional rights upon entering a school, the protection of the First
Amendment still applies in the school setting.14 This setting, however,
presents particular concerns for safety and the educational mission, and
therefore presents a conflict between school rules and Constitutional
guarantees.15 The school district argued that their rule was valid
because it properly prevented disruption and disturbance to the learning
environment and protected against discord grown from divisive
viewpoints.16 The Court held that this “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.”17 The school must show facts that would lead
them to forecast substantial disruption and interference with school
activities.18 Short of that, the school is impermissibly suppressing free
expression in order to avoid the discomfort of unpopular opinions.19
The Tinker court specifically stated that its holding does not relate
to regulating “the length of skirts or type of clothing, to hair style or
deportment.”20 The Tinker test only applies to symbolic speech in
schools where the wearer intends a particular message to be conveyed
by their vestments.21 The average student’s clothing usually only
reflects the wearer’s preference, and others would probably view the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 507–08.
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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clothing as conveying just that.22 The Ninth Circuit took exactly this
view.23
While generic clothing cannot be construed as symbolic speech, a
number of circuit courts have addressed protection of other aspects of
appearance. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a huge number of cases
were brought by boys challenging school rules regarding hair length.24
It was the style at the time for boys to wear their hair long, and schools,
in an effort to keep their students clean-cut and presentable, instituted
provisions in their dress code mandating how long boys were allowed
to wear their hair.25 Many courts during this time agreed that there was
a Constitutional right to govern one’s own appearance.26 Absent the
symbolic speech discussed in Tinker, these courts agree that the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech did not protect choice of hairstyle
because there is no intended message to be conveyed.27
These courts have sought to find another source for the right to
choose one’s appearance. The Ninth Amendment protects the rights of
the people not otherwise enumerated with specific protection in the Bill
of Rights.28 The right to one’s appearance has been viewed as fitting
within this vein.29 Others have found the right as one of liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment30 or within the penumbra of privacy described
by the Supreme Court as being found generally within the Bill of
Rights.31 Regardless of where this right comes from, it has been
recognized by a number of Circuit courts, and state courts and has
never been contradicted by the Supreme Court.32
Under this view, courts have found that students do have a right to
control their own appearance and wear their hair how they wanted.33
Schools, however, do have the right to promulgate rules that protect
22. King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that
the regulation for hair length was not intended to curtail speech rights, and the students in
violation did not have any intention of using their hair as a symbol for any kind of speech).
23. See id.
24. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) DOC9; Crews v.
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
25. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286; Breen, 419 F.2d at 1035.
26. See Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075; Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036; Richards, 424 F.2d at
1285.
27. E.g. Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1074–75.
28. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
29. Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075.
30. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284.
31. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1970).
32. The right to one’s appearance has been found to fall under the “liberty umbrella” of
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the California Constitution by California courts.
Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 334 (1971).
33. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286.
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student safety and further the educational mission.34 Rules that infringe
on students’ rights, therefore, must be tailored to further permissible
goals.35 In the aforementioned cases, hair length regulations were
defended as promoting hygiene and preventing distraction.36 Courts
have come out both ways on this issue, some finding that schools could
permissibly regulate hair length,37 and others finding that the
regulations were unrelated to the suggested justifications.38
Just as Tinker did not extend its holding to regulations on “the
length of skirts” or other non-symbolic clothing choices,39 some of
these hair length cases have similarly excluded clothing from their
holdings.40 As justification for this, the First Circuit stated that
clothing can be changed depending on the setting—that clothing one
wears to school can be easily changed from what could be worn
elsewhere—while hair is a more permanent part of one’s own
appearance, not as easily adjusted for different circumstances.41
Similarly, justification for “skirt length” regulations in schools would
be easier to find than one for hair length.42 Courts have not addressed
hair length or other appearance-related cases in this vein since the
1970s, as changes in cultural views of appearance led to looser school
rules, prompting fewer challenges.43
There are plenty of very worthy dress code provisions at schools
all around the country that do not infringe upon free expression,
allowing the schools to achieve their educational goals in a safe
environment. California’s Education Code, for example, even has
specific provisions for dress code regulations as it relates to safety.44
Students in California public schools have the right to be safe and
secure in their person while at school.45 To this end, the California
34. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–10 (1969).
35. Id.
36. “Once the personal liberty is shown, the countervailing interest must either be selfevident or be affirmatively shown. We see no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or
good conduct requires a boy to wear his hair short.” Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286; but see
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding that long hair might affect
sanitation of the pool or distract others from strong academic performance).
37. See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286.
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507–08.
40. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285.
41. Id. at 1285.
42. Id.
43. Rather than attacking individual aspects of dress codes, following this string of
1970s cases (and their overall lack of success in challenging these provisions), plaintiffs
have instead attacked public school uniform requirements, which became popular in the
early 21st Century. See infra note 57.
44. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a).
45. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(1).
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Education Code allows for schools to institute dress codes and even
uniform policies to prevent gang-related apparel from disrupting the
school environment.46 Similarly, schools may prohibit clothing that
can conceal, or even be used as, weapons in order to protect the safety
of everyone on the school campus.47 In areas where gang affiliation is
a concern, clothing becomes an issue to the extent that it indicates
gang-related association or threats, distracting students from school and
instead diverting their attention to their own personal safety.48
Individual rights, such as free expression, that are not subject to a
specified heightened scrutiny are reviewed by courts under the rational
basis test.49
Under this test, any conceivable and legitimate
government interest will suffice to justify the governmental regulation
at issue, so long as they are rationally related to the means utilized.50
This almost certainly ensures that the government will overcome any
challenge.51 There is precedent for finding that dress codes may be
arbitrary, overbroad, or unrelated to the educational mission so as to be
found invalid.52 A length requirement for girls’ shorts, for example, is
an arbitrary choice of four inches above the knee.53 Preventing
garments from being too short does further the valid purpose of
preventing indecency, but four inches is an arbitrary length; four inches
above the knee looks different on a girl who is five feet tall versus a
girl who is nearly six feet tall.54 To that end, a court may find the
provision to be arbitrary and therefore invalid and unenforceable, as
was done by the Arkansas court in Wallace v. Ford.55 Similarly, the
defendant school must show that there is a rational relationship
between any type of banned clothing and furthering its educational
mission, which cannot be found if the rule is arbitrary.56
More recently, there has been a renewed interest in free
46. Id.
47. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(2)–(4)
48. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(5)–(6)
49. The liberty interest here of dressing as one chooses, because it has not been
specifically addressed by the Supreme Court, is not a fundamental right subject to strict
scrutiny.
50. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
51. If the government can give a conceivable rationale of a legitimate use of legislative
or executive power in enacting a law or rule which may consequently infringe on some
rights, the court will allow the law or rule to stand as a show of respect for the political
branches and preserving the separation of powers.
52. See Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
53. Id. at 163–64. See infra Part IV.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 164. Dress code provisions that are “arbitrary” do not satisfy the
constitutional requirement that any rule that infringes on students’ rights must be rationally
related to the legitimate goal of the school.
56. Id.
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expression claims in dress codes due to a trend toward mandatory
uniforms for public schools.57 The Ninth Circuit addressed a
mandatory uniform in a Nevada public school as having the potential to
invade First Amendment rights, though found that the particular dress
code in that case did not infringe on constitutionally protected rights.58
Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Jacobs v. Clark County School
District, speech rights in public schools fall into one of three
categories: “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech,
(2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into neither of
these categories.”59 Dress codes fall into neither of the first two
categories.60 The third category of all other types of speech, according
to the Ninth Circuit, is to be viewed with “Tinker scrutiny.”61 The
Supreme Court, however, limited Tinker’s test of “substantial
interference” to “pure speech” that conveys a particularized message.62
The Ninth Circuit has confirmed Tinker’s limitations.63 Because
Tinker cannot be applied to all speech rights outside offensive speech
and school-sponsored speech, the Ninth Circuit has utilized a different
approach.64
Content- and viewpoint-neutral dress codes that have an incidental
impact on students’ rights of free expression must survive intermediate
scrutiny in order to be found constitutional.65 A law or regulation is
content-neutral if it does not limit speech based on particular subjectmatters.66 Viewpoint-neutrality is satisfied when the regulation does
not differentiate based on various opinions within a certain subjectmatter.67
Intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment claims have a specific

57. E.g., Tamar Lewin, Dress for Success: Public School Uniforms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25,
1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/25/us/dress-for-success-public-schooluniforms.html.
58. Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 426, 437–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
that mandatory uniform policies do not infringe on students’ constitutionally protected right
to “expressive conduct”) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 429 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1992).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08, 511 (1969)
(stating that the Court’s holding does not pertain to “the length of skirts or type of clothing,
to hair style or deportment”).
63. King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that
the regulation for hair length was not intended to curtail speech rights, and the students in
violation did not have any intention of using their hair as a symbol for any kind of speech).
64. Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434.
65. Id.
66. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S, 622, 643 (1994).
67. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).
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test.68 The law subject to this level of scrutiny will be upheld as
constitutional if: (1) “it furthers an important or substantial government
interest”; (2) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression”; and (3) “the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.”69 The first prong of this test has two parts, namely
that the government interest must be important or substantial, and the
rule furthers that interest.70 The test as described by the Supreme Court
and applied to school dress codes by the Ninth Circuit is silent on how
close the relationship between the school’s rule and its purpose must be
in this context. The governmental interest must be unrelated to
suppressing free expression and the suppression that does occur must
be as minimal as possible.71 The nature of dress codes inherently does
suppress expression in and of itself, but courts have found that a
regulation is permissible if the government entity’s stated intention is
not directed at speech or expression.72 The Ninth Circuit found that the
uniform policy only limited one form of student expression while
keeping open many other channels for expression.73
In summation, the Ninth Circuit currently uses intermediate
scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-neutral laws that infringe upon free
expression.74 The three-prong test requires that the rule further an
important government interest, has a purpose unrelated to suppressing
expression, and is the most minimally oppressive alternative available
to further the government’s interest.75 Content-based or viewpointbased rules for appearance and dress are evaluated using the Tinker
test.76 As of yet, however, courts have not examined the most recent
dress code issues, dealing with “school dress codes only target[ing]
girls.”77
B.

Gender Discrimination

California courts treat gender discrimination differently than those
at the federal level. These differences in development and treatment

68. Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434.
69. Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 661–62).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 434–35.
73. Id. at 437.
74. See generally Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008).
75. Id. at 434.
76. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
77. Lilian Min, This school just punished at least 25 girls (and zero boys) for dress
code violations during a massive heatwave, HELLO GIGGLES, June 17, 2015,
http://hellogiggles.com/only-girls-punished-dress-code.
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will be discussed separately below, first at the California state level,
followed by the federal level.
1. California Equal Protection
The California Constitution states that “a person may not be . . .
denied equal protection of the laws.”78 Under equal protection law,
some discrimination is permitted for effective legislation and
enforcement of laws, but certain categories are protected more
stringently than others.79 The highest level of protection is given to
those within suspect classes.80 In California, gender has been treated as
a suspect class since 1971.81
In Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, bar owners sought a writ of mandate
to prevent the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control from
revoking their licenses because they had hired female bartenders.82 The
department at that time could have acceptably revoked such licenses
because the Business and Professions Code included a provision that
prohibited women from being bartenders, unless they were wives or
direct family members of the holder of the liquor license.83 This rule
was challenged as a violation of the equal protection of the law as
guaranteed in the California Constitution.84 The California Supreme
Court invalidated the rule85 and established sex as a suspect class under
California law, subjecting all laws making distinctions based on gender
to strict scrutiny.86 The court found that sex is an immutable trait that
“frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society,” similar to race or lineage.87 Women were traditionally
prohibited from full participation in American society as a protective
measure, resulting from outdated stereotypes about women and their
“proper” role.88 Gender is therefore treated as a suspect class in
California to prevent the continued use of sexual stereotypes in

78. Cal. Const. art. I § 7.
79. Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1971).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 17.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. (citing Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 25656).
84. Id. at 15. The relevant sections of the California Constitution at the time the case
was decided was art. I §§ 11, 21 but these numbers have since changed.
85. Petitioners in this case also challenged on the basis of a different section of the
California Constitution (Cal. Const. art. XX § 18 (since renumbered to Cal. Const. art. I §
8)) as well as under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution. Sail'er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d at 6 (1971).
86. Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18 (1971).
87. Id. Immutable characteristics such as these are typically treated as suspect classes.
88. Id.
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invidious practices.89 California public policy thus mandates equal
treatment of men and women.90
Because gender is a suspect class in California, laws that make
distinctions based on gender are subject to strict scrutiny.91 Under this
level of review, such laws may be upheld only if they are shown to be
necessary to further a compelling state interest, using the least
restrictive means available.92 The challenger always bears the burden
of showing unconstitutionality but pointing out express gender
classifications within a statutory scheme meets this burden in
California.93 Essentially, when gender classifications are unnecessary
and gender-neutral alternatives are available, the law in question is
unconstitutional.94
Equal protection jurisprudence differentiates between facially
neutral and facially discriminatory classifications.95
Facially
discriminatory classifications involve blatant disparate treatment
between men and women on the face of the government rule, while
facially neutral rules are silent on their classification but have a
disparate impact one gender over the other.96
For facially discriminatory laws, the key consideration for the
court is whether the gender distinctions are necessary to further a
compelling state interest and whether gender-neutral alternatives are
available.97 The school rule must also be necessary to further the
compelling interest; the means to the ends must be narrowly tailored.98
Strict scrutiny also requires that no gender-neutral alternatives are
available.99 No law that makes direct gender distinctions can survive if
gender-neutral alternatives are available and not implemented in place
of the gender-conscious distinction.100
Strict scrutiny is only automatically applied when, as previously
stated, the rule differentiates between the sexes on its face.101 In order
to show gender discrimination through a neutral law, the plaintiff must
also show that the law was created with a discriminatory intent;
89. Id. at 18–20.
90. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 37 (1985).
91. See id.; See also Sail’er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20.
92. Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658, 674 (2008) (citing Connerly v. State Pers.
Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 33 (2001)).
93. Id.
94. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674.
95. See Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1 (1978).
96. Id.
97. See Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674.
98. Id. at 674–75.
99. Id. (citing Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 36 (2001)).
100. Id.
101. Hardy, 21 Cal. 3d 1 at 7.
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discriminatory effect is not enough to elicit strict scrutiny.102
Discriminatory intent is shown through the state selecting a course of
action because of the adverse effects it will create on a particular
group, not simply in spite of these effect.103 This intent element is
subjective—in that the state must have purposefully intended for the
law to discriminate—rather than objective—wherein the state’s actions,
by their nature, would lead to a discriminatory effect.104 Without
discriminatory intent, discrimination based on gender cannot be
found.105 Without such purposeful discrimination against a suspect
class, the court cannot utilize strict scrutiny against the law.106 Instead,
the court will apply the rational basis test. In such a case, the state
action must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose in order to be found constitutional.107
2. Federal Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”108 Just as under the California
Constitution, federal jurisprudence reviews any law burdening a
suspect class under strict scrutiny.109 But unlike in California, gender
is not a suspect class under federal law and therefore does not receive
strict scrutiny.110 In 1976, the Supreme Court developed a new level of
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.111 Based on previous cases that invalidated
gender discrimination, the Court evaluated an Oklahoma law using
what would be termed intermediate scrutiny.112 The law allowed
women to purchase low alcohol content beer at age eighteen, but
required men to be twenty-one for such a purchase.113 The Court found
that the Equal Protection Clause requires that “classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”114 The
Oklahoma law did not meet this level of scrutiny and was found

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Baluyut v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 837 (1996).
Id. at 36–37 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)).
See id. at 37.
See Hardy, 21 Cal. 3d at 7.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Id.at 197.
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unconstitutional.115
For gender classifications, the Supreme Court has been adamant
about what governmental objectives will be found sufficiently
important to survive intermediate scrutiny.116 Most recently, the Court
has expressed these considerations in United States v. Virginia,
wherein the Virginia Military Institute was found in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it refused admission to women. 117 The
Court articulated that the governmental body defending such a genderbased classification must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive
justification.”118 Such a justification must be demonstrably genuine
and not merely created as a response to litigation.119 Overbroad
generalizations about differences between males and females relating
to their talents, capacities or preferences are impermissible.120 Utilizing
sex as a proxy for furthering “traditional” gender roles that bear no
relation to desired qualities would be found similarly lacking as an
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”121
The Supreme Court
jurisprudence requires that the justification for such a classification be
genuine and not merely concocted in response to an equal protection
challenge against it.122 Virginia Military Institute’s objectives in
refusing to admit women were not backed by the required “exceedingly
persuasive justification” and the school was ordered to allow admission
to women.123
Once a court does find an important purpose or “exceedingly
persuasive justification,” the court then looks to find a substantial
relationship between the gender classification and the important
purpose.124 This substantial relationship is very fact-specific, and the
Supreme Court has found that a gender-related classification does not
require that the rule under consideration must, in every instance, be
capable of achieving its ultimate objective.125 To require such a strong
relationship would entail a higher level of review than intermediate
scrutiny. Cases have been decided both ways on whether such a
substantial relationship exists between the means and ends in gender

115. Id. at 210.
116. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
117. Id. at 558.
118. Id. at 531.
119. Id. at 533.
120. Id.
121. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976); see also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. at 534.
122. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
123. Id. at 534.
124. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
125. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001).

272

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:57

discrimination cases.126
Just as in California, federal equal protection differentiates
between facially neutral and facially discriminatory laws.127 In order
for a gender-neutral law to receive intermediate scrutiny for genderbased discrimination, the Supreme Court has laid out a two-part test.128
First, the classification in question must be truly neutral and not
gender-based in a covert manner.129 If not, the court looks to find a
discriminatory purpose behind the gender-neutral law.130
Only
disparate impact as a result of invidious gender discrimination will
suffice to receive intermediate scrutiny.131 In that second inquiry, the
evidence of disparate impact is a starting point, but must be the result
of purposeful discrimination in order to be found unconstitutional.132
Such purposeful discrimination must be proved, just as under
California law.133 The California courts borrowed analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to equal protection under the
California Constitution.134 As such, the same intent element is required
under federal law, wherein the subjective intent of the governmental
body in enacting the gender-neutral provision was to unequally burden
one gender.135 Without proof of intentional invidious discrimination,
courts will not invalidate a law, neutral on its face and serving
otherwise legitimate ends, that happens to have a greater effect on one
group than on another.136

126. See generally Nguyen 533 U.S. at 73 (finding a substantial relationship between
stricter requirements for proving paternity than for maternity and the government’s goal of
preventing fraud in naturalization claims); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204
(1976); (finding a substantial relationship lacking between the important purpose of
preventing drunk driving and imposing separate age requirements for men and women
purchasing alcohol).
127. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
128. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
129. Id. In this case, the State of Massachusetts gave preferential hiring in government
jobs to veterans. This practice had the effect of denying Ms. Feeney from government
positions and promotions, as women were denied opportunities in the armed forces until
very recently. The classification was one of veterans versus non-veterans, but because
nearly all veterans were men at that time, women were effectively excluded from this
favored group. The Court found, however, that because men were in both categories of
veterans and non-veterans, the classification was not covertly gender-based.
130. Id. at 274.
131. See id. at 278–80.
132. Id. at 274.
133. See supra Part I.B.1.
134. Baluyut v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 837 (1996) (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
135. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
136. Id.
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ISSUE

Gender discrimination in public school dress codes is a two-tiered
issue: essentially, free expression rights for students to choose their
clothing are burdened more heavily for girls than for boys; the free
expression issue is embedded within a gender discrimination issue.
This duality of constitutional concerns is denied full review on the
merits due to current jurisprudence. Both in California and at the
federal level, absent a facially discriminatory law, a plaintiff must
prove purposeful discrimination in order to receive any kind of
heightened scrutiny.137 Showing proof of purposeful discrimination is
a very high bar to meet, and plaintiffs rarely, if ever, succeed in
showing that a neutral law is promulgated with discriminatory intent.138
When this discriminatory intent, even if it does exist, cannot be shown,
the plaintiff cannot receive heightened scrutiny, and a court will not
reach the proper merits of the discrimination claim. For girls receiving
dress code violations at a higher rate than boys, this means that their
discrimination claim will receive only rational basis review, wherein
the court will almost certainly find in favor of the school. The only
other alternative is to challenge the dress code purely on freedom of
expression grounds under the First Amendment,139 even though the real
issue is that it is girls whose free expression rights are being unduly
restricted, while boys are not likewise burdened. Additionally, schools
today rarely create dress codes that would violate free expression on
their face, due to over four decades of state and federal litigation on the
subject.140
III.

ANALYSIS

To illustrate this issue, let us consider this fact pattern:
Emma is a fourteen-year-old freshman at a California public high
school. On a hot day, she decided to wear a pair of shorts and a tank
top to school. The shorts reached down to her mid-thigh and the straps
on her tank top sufficiently covered her undergarments, cleavage, and
midriff, exposing only her shoulders and her neck. She went through
the morning at school without comment from any of her friends or
teachers in regards to her appearance. At lunchtime, however, she
walked across the quad and was stopped by Vice Principal Smith, who
told Emma to accompany her to the administrative office. On their
137. See supra Parts I.B.1. –2.
138. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241–42; see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 276–79 (1979); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987).
139. See supra Part I.A.
140. See supra Parts I.A. & I.B.1.
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way, they walked by a group of boys wearing shorts and tank tops who
complained about the heat. In the office, Vice Principal Smith took a
ruler and put it beside Emma’s knees. She informed Emma that her
shorts were five inches above her knees, rather than the acceptable four
inches, and her tank top was a prohibited item in the dress code. She
would have to wait in the office for her parents to bring her a change of
clothes before she would be allowed to go back to class. Emma ended
up missing a math quiz while she was waiting, and was unable to make
it up due to missing class for disciplinary reasons. Emma left that day
feeling embarrassed at being told to change, annoyed for being singled
out when boys were wearing similar clothing, and worried about her
math grade. Emma’s mother came to talk to Vice Principal Smith
about the incident and was told that the dress code is a way of
preventing disruption and distraction in school and keeping students
focused on education rather than what others are wearing. Emma’s
mother was given a copy of the school’s dress code policy,141 which
shows that Emma was in violation. Emma and her parents feel that this
is a violation of her rights and wish to challenge it.
The remainder of this section will go through an analysis of this
fictitious case using current state and federal law on the issue.142 As
described above, current laws do not allow for a case such as Emma’s
to have a chance of prevailing.

141. The dress code of Emma’s high school is as follows:
(1) Clothes, apparel or attire must be sufficient to conceal undergarments at all times.
Clothing, apparel or attire that fails to provide adequate coverage of the body,
including but not limited to, see-through or fishnet fabrics, bare midriffs, tank
tops, spaghetti strap tops, off-the-shoulder or low-cut tops are prohibited.
(2) Clothing, grooming, accessories, and jewelry shall be free of writing, pictures,
symbols or any other insignia which are crude, vulgar, profane, obscene, libelous,
slanderous, or sexually suggestive. Clothing, grooming, accessories or jewelry
that degrade any cultural, religious or ethnic values or which advocate racial,
ethnic, or religious prejudice or discrimination, or which promote gang-affiliation,
sex, the use of tobacco, drugs, or alcohol or any unlawful acts, are prohibited.
(3) Female-specific prohibited items include: tube tops, low-cut tops that expose
cleavage, tops that expose most or all of the back (such as halter tops), skirts or
shorts which are shorter than four inches above the knee (even when walking),
and yoga pants or leggings worn without an outer garment that does not reach
four inches above the knee.
(4) Male-specific prohibited items include: sagging pants, and bandanas
Modified based on the dress code of Foothill High School in Pleasanton, CA, found at:
http://www.foothillfalcons.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=45194&type=d&pREC_ID
=57384;
and the dress code of Vista Murrieta High School in Murrieta, CA, found at:
http://www.murrieta.k12.ca.us/cms/lib5/CA01000508/Centricity/Domain/1685/Student%20
Handbook%2015-16-Editable.pdf.
142. See infra Part III.
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Free Expression

Current law regarding to free expression claims against public
school dress codes are subject to intermediate scrutiny.143 Here,
Emma’s claim could potentially succeed in proving the dress code
provisions cannot survive intermediate scrutiny. The stated intention
of the school in promulgating the dress code is to “prevent distraction
and disruption of its students.”144 Given the rampant potential for
distraction in public schools, this goal is certainly an important one;
schools have a duty to educate students, and disruption frustrates this
purpose. The problem the school faces here is in the second part of this
first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test: the dress code must further
the school’s interest. The test as described by the Supreme Court and
applied to school dress codes by the Ninth Circuit is silent on how
close the relationship between the rule and the purpose must be in this
context.145 A court could take a very loose approach and find that
because a dress code could conceivably serve to prevent distraction and
disruption in school, this prong of the test is satisfied. But a court
could just as realistically require a closer relationship. In that instance,
the school would need to show that tank tops—on both boys and
girls—and girls’ shorts shorter than four inches above the knee are in
fact distracting or disruptive to the educational process. Barring visible
undergarments or inappropriate parts of the body showing, those items
of clothing are not distracting.146 If the school cannot show that the
dress code, as applied to Emma, in fact does further the school’s goals,
the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test must fail.
Assuming, arguendo, that a court hearing Emma’s claim chose to
apply a looser interpretation and finds the first prong satisfied, the court
would then move on to the second and third prongs. The governmental
interest must be unrelated to suppressing free expression, and the
suppression that does occur must be as minimal as possible.147 The
school’s stated intention in this case is preventing distraction and
disruption, which on its face is unrelated to prohibiting expression.
The nature of dress codes inherently does suppress expression in and of
itself, but courts have found that a regulation is permissible if the

143. See Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 434–35 (9th Cir. 2008).
144. See infra Part III.
145. See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S.
622, 661–62 (1994).
146. If a fourteen-year-old girl’s shoulders are in fact distracting to education—
especially when boys wearing clothing that exposes their shoulders is not found to be
equally distracting, despite the gender-neutral ban on tank tops—then this bespeaks a far
greater problem than just the First Amendment implications of this dress code.
147. See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434–35.
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government entity’s stated intention is not directed at speech or
expression.148 A court in this case would likely find the intention of
Emma’s school to be permissible.
As for the third prong, requiring, essentially, for no less onerous
alternatives to the suppression of expression, the issue is much closer.
In a case regarding a free expression challenge to a mandatory uniform
policy, the Ninth Circuit found that the uniform policy only limited one
form of student expression, while keeping open many other channels
for expression.149 A court in this case could apply the same rationale
and find that, because the dress code at Emma’s school is less limiting
than a mandatory uniform, there is far less suppression of expression.
Alternatively, because Emma’s school has decided against a uniform
policy and has instead carved out exceptions and complex rules
regarding dress, it has created a more onerous alternative than a full
uniform. This is due to the arguably arbitrary nature of the rules
promulgated as well as their selective enforcement.150 Overly complex
rules can do more harm than simple, sweeping ones.151 In choosing to
institute a uniform policy, the school would probably have more
success in furthering its objectives, rather than a complicated set of
provisions left open to interpretation by the students who are subject to
them and the school staff enforcing them. When applied as they were
against Emma, enforcing these rules causes more distraction and
disruption than they perhaps prevent. If a court accepts this reasoning,
the third prong of the intermediate scrutiny test has failed. This
argument, however, is something of a stretch. A court would more
than likely find the dress code at Emma’s school to be a valid,
constitutionally permissible exercise of school authority, upholding this
and other dress codes around the country.
B.

Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination is the main thrust of this paper’s interest,
and the main problem with the current state of the law. Here, Emma
has two separate but related equal protection claims under both
California and federal law.

148. Id. at 436.
149. See Jacobs.
150. According to Section 1 of the dress code, tank tops are prohibited as ‘overly
revealing’ clothing, a rule that applies equally to both boys and girls. Yet boys wearing tank
tops were ignored as Emma was disciplined for her tank top. Additionally, Sections 3 and 4
of the dress code are directed specifically to girls and to boys, respectively. The gender
disparity is discussed below.
151. See, e.g. Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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1. California Equal Protection
Emma’s first claim is the ban on tank tops in Section 1152 of the
dress code as applied to Emma and not to the boys wearing tank tops
against whom the dress code was not enforced. The second is the
female-only ban on shorts shorter than four inches above the knee
stated in Section 3 of the dress code.153 Emma would argue that the
former is a gender-neutral rule with a disparate impact on girls, while
the second is a facially discriminatory provision that cannot survive
strict scrutiny.
The facially discriminatory provision will be discussed first, as it
would have the greatest likelihood of success. Section 3 of the dress
code lists a specific list of clothing items that are prohibited for female
students.154 Section 4 has a far shorter list of items that are prohibited
for male students.155 While the school will surely argue that these
differences were made out of practicality—boys wearing the femaleprohibited items are not a problem, and vice versa—under California
law, this is somewhat irrelevant. The key consideration for the court is
whether the gender distinctions are necessary to further a compelling
state interest, and whether gender-neutral alternatives are available.156
Sections 3 and 4 of the school dress code likely would not survive this
strict scrutiny test.
First, while the school’s stated purpose of preventing distraction
and disruption is arguably compelling,157 the school likely would not
be able to show that Sections 3 and 4, as written, are necessary in
furthering this purpose. The way the gender-conscious provisions are
written, a girl wearing a bandana or a boy wearing a tube top, for
example, would not be in violation of the dress code. If the bandana
prohibition for males is in relation to the gang-related safety concerns
addressed in Section 2 of the dress code,158 then the harm of girls
152. See supra note 142.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658, 674 (2008).
157. This purpose was found to be important/substantial in the Ninth Circuit federal
court when school dress codes were examined under federal free expression intermediate
scrutiny, as discussed above, supra Part III.A, but California courts have not yet examined
school dress codes using strict scrutiny for gender discrimination. Until a California court
has determined what compelling purposes are under California law, the disposition for such
a claim is unclear. Due to lack of California jurisprudence on the matter, this paper fills in
gaps using federal precedent on the issue. Federal courts have not refuted schools for
having a stated purpose of preventing distraction and disruption in school. (See generally
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
158. A provision banning bandanas due to safety concerns with gangs is a common and
permissible exercise of school authority in promulgating a dress code. Safety concerns such
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wearing bandanas as a showing of gang affiliation would be just as
harmful as boys doing so. As for the regulation on length of shorts for
girls, while it may be more common for girls to wear shorter shorts
than boys, shorts shorter than four inches above the knee made for
males are not unheard of.159 Just as with the bandana provision, if a
male student were to wear shorts shorter than four inches above his
knees, he would not be found in violation of the dress code as Emma
was for her shorts. These examples show that the gender discrepancies
in the banned items of clothing in Sections 3 and 4 are not necessary in
preventing distraction and disruption in school. In order to be
necessary to further a compelling interest, the means to that end must
be narrowly tailored.160 If these provisions were narrowly tailored, the
interests of the school should still be furthered, or at least not at issue,
when the provisions are applied cross-gender.
Additionally, strict scrutiny requires that no gender-neutral
alternatives are available.161 No law that makes direct gender
distinctions can survive if gender-neutral alternatives are available and
not implemented in place of the gender-conscious distinction.162 As
pointed out above, the gender-based prohibitions of clothing would
likely not be found necessary to accomplish the intent of Emma’s
school. The same goals can be attained by eliminating the gender
distinctions altogether. This is an alternative available to the school,
and it creates a gender-neutral rule. Because this alternative is
available and was not utilized by the school, Sections 3 and 4 of the
dress code would likely be found to fail the strict scrutiny test in
California courts.
Emma’s other equal protection claim is much trickier. Strict
scrutiny is only automatically applied when, as in the previous section,
the rule differentiates between the sexes on its face.163 Section 1 of the
dress code at Emma’s school is a gender neutral provision, prohibiting
tank tops worn by any student, regardless of gender.164 As applied,
according to the facts above and more than likely based on evidence

as these also create distraction and disruption, so the safety provisions also contribute to the
goal of preventing such distraction and disruption. See Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a).
159. Shorter shorts on men are currently in fashion and sold at stores popular with boys
of high school age. See, for example, these popular shorts sold by Chubbies:
https://www.chubbiesshorts.com/.
160. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674–75.
161. Id. at 674.
162. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 675 (citing Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 92 Cal. App.
4th 16, 36 (2001)).
163. Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 7 (1978).
164. See supra note 142.
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collected in discovery,165 girls receive disciplinary action as a result of
wearing tank tops far more often than boys, despite both genders
wearing tank tops in violation of the dress code. This serves to show a
disparate impact, unequally burdening girls.166 In order to succeed in
an equal protection claim, Emma would need to show that this genderneutral provision was enacted with an intent to discriminate against
girls.167
In Emma’s case, it is highly unlikely that such a discriminatory
intent could be shown. The gender-neutral tank top ban, like the rest of
the dress code, was created to prevent distraction and disruption to the
educational process. Such an intent is unrelated to any gender
differences. The only way there could be a discriminatory intent would
be if, in deciding to include tank tops in clothing that “fails to provide
adequate coverage of the body,”168 the school knew that only girls
wearing tank tops would fall under this description and intended to
only enforce this provision against girls. Failing this, as one likely
would, one cannot sufficiently prove discriminatory intent.
If Emma cannot show that the school intended to discriminate
with the tank top ban in Section 1 of the dress code, the court will not
apply strict scrutiny to her claim. This is because without
discriminatory intent, discrimination based on gender cannot be
found.169 Without such purposeful discrimination against a suspect
class, the court cannot utilize strict scrutiny against the law.170 Instead,
the court will apply the rational basis test,171 and Emma realistically
cannot win her challenge to the dress code. The school’s goal of
preventing distraction and disruption is certainly a legitimate state

165. Schools, typically keep disciplinary records of students, and a survey of such
records would more than likely turn up evidence that the tank top ban yields disciplinary
action against girls far more often than boys. And by talking to students and teachers and
others at the school, evidence could be gathered to show that boys as well as girls wear tank
tops—therein showing that girls are not the only ones who wear them and therefore are the
only ones disciplined for doing so. In short, it would not be a stretch to assume that this
policy at this and many other schools is enforced overwhelmingly against girls, creating the
disparate impact complained of here.
166. This would be consistent with news stories and studies at high schools across the
country. For example, in a 2014 survey conducted at Menlo-Atherton High School in
California, 64% of the 118 girls interviewed had been given some sort of disciplinary
warning about their appearance violating the dress code, compared with only 12% of the
111 boys interviewed.
http://www.mabearnews.org/news/2014/01/13/feminist-clubreleases-dress-code-survey-feedback-with-alarming-results/
167. See supra Part I.B.1.
168. See supra note 142.
169. See Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 7–8 (1978).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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interest,172 and a dress code is a rational way to achieve such a goal.
Therefore, if Emma cannot show that the tank top ban was enacted
with the purpose of unequally burdening girls, she will not succeed on
this claim.
2. Federal Equal Protection
If Emma were not in California, which provides stronger
protection against gender discrimination,173 the default position would
be to use the Fourteenth Amendment and federal equal protection
jurisprudence.174 Just as under California law, Emma has a claim
against the facially discriminatory provisions in Sections 3 and 4, and a
claim against the gender neutral provision in Section 1.
For the claim against the facially discriminatory provisions, the
first consideration is the school’s purpose.175 While the dress code was
viewed as a whole under intermediate scrutiny with regards to free
expression, equal protection claims require not just that the purpose of
the dress code be important, but that the justification for utilizing a sexbased classification be important as well.176 Here, the school’s purpose
in enacting the dress code was to prevent distraction and disruption to
the educational process. As discussed above, a court would almost
certainly find this to be an important purpose.177 But this purpose does
not describe the specific use of gender-based distinctions for banned
clothing items in Sections 3 and 4. The Supreme Court jurisprudence
requires that the justification for such a classification be genuine and
not merely concocted in response to an equal protection challenge
against it.178 Therefore, Emma’s school must have evidence of the
need for such sex-based clothing prohibitions when the dress code was
promulgated, an issue that would be explored during discovery in the
litigation process.
A court would then have to determine if this is an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for such a classification.179 Emma would
argue that the school’s purpose does not meet this standard. An
assumption that boys and girls wear different types of clothing is an
172. If such a goal would be found to be important or substantial under intermediate
scrutiny, a higher level to meet, it will definitely found to be a legitimate state interest under
rational basis. See King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939–40 (9th Cir.
1971).
173. See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16–17 (1971); See supra Part I.B.1.
174. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; Supra Part I.B.2.
175. See supra Part I.B.2.
176. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); See supra Part I.B.2.
177. See King, 445 F.2d at 939–40.
178. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
179. Id. at 531.
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assumption based on the preferences of males and females. It also is
becoming an outdated view of youth culture in the United States.180
Because perceived preferences between the sexes do not constitute an
‘important’ purpose for a gender-based classification or an
“exceedingly persuasive justification,”181 the school’s purpose here
fails to meet its required threshold under intermediate scrutiny.
Additionally, this purpose is based not only on preferences, but it seeks
to perpetuate traditional gender roles and stereotypes, which is
similarly unacceptable.182 The exact length specification is an arbitrary
requirement designed to impose traditional ideas of modesty onto
young girls.183 This preservation of gender roles that impose
patriarchal protectionist views of girls is unacceptable under
intermediate scrutiny, as it fails to be an “exceedingly persuasive
justification.”184 Therefore, if the court accepts this line of argument,
the school would not meet its burden of having an important
governmental interest in imposing a gender-based classification.
Realistically, a court could very well find that the school’s
purpose was sufficiently important, so the next consideration would be
the fit between the means and ends of the dress code.185 In this case,
assuming that boys and girls wearing different clothing and thereby
prohibiting different items of clothing for each is an important
justification, the relationship between the gender classification and the
school’s goal would likely be sufficiently substantial, and Sections 3
and 4 would be upheld under intermediate scrutiny, defeating Emma’s
claim.
Emma’s second equal protection claim is against the genderneutral ban on tank tops. Just as under California law, Emma would
first have to show that the tank top ban is, at its root, a gender-based

180. Emerging issues regarding gender fluidity and transgender individuals are beyond
the scope of this paper and will therefore not be discussed at length. These changes in
gender roles and gender norms, as well as the very idea of gender itself, are very much real
in American society today. Such concepts are also more prevalent in younger people, many
of whom are students at public schools.
181. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
182. Id. at 533–34.
183. Even back in the 1970s, when traditional gender roles were still in full force, one
district court found a length requirement for skirts to be arbitrary because a certain number
of inches in length look different on a girl who is five feet tall versus a girl who is nearly six
feet tall. Even if preserving female modesty was an acceptably ‘important’ goal for the
school to have, a requisite length for skirts was not an effective way to accomplish it. See
Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 164 (1972).
184. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976); see also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. at 534.
185. See supra Part I.B.2.
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provision.186 If an intent to apply this provision only to female students
can be found, a court can find that this gender-neutral provision is in
fact gender-biased, thereby receiving intermediate scrutiny just as any
facial classification based on gender would receive.187 If Emma fails to
show that the gender-neutral provision is overtly gender-based, she
must instead show purposeful discrimination.188 Without proof of
intentional invidious discrimination, courts will not invalidate a law,
neutral on its face and serving otherwise legitimate ends, that happens
to have a greater effect on one group than on another.189 Just as under
California equal protection, it is unlikely that Emma could prevail
here.190 Intent to discriminate likely cannot be sufficiently proved in
order for the court to apply intermediate scrutiny. Without any kind of
heightened scrutiny, a court would not be able to fully examine the full
picture of a claim such as this, leaving Emma and plaintiffs like her
with no chance at having a valid challenge, let alone winning a case
like this and seeking a fair remedy.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Because a case such as Emma’s cannot, under current state and
federal law, even pass the threshold of any heightened scrutiny, courts
should take a different approach for gender discrimination in regards to
public school dress codes. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove
discriminatory intent, courts should employ a burden-shifting
rebuttable presumption. Using this method, a plaintiff would need to
show only the disparate impact of dress code provisions that unequally
burden girls in order to have a court apply the requisite heightened
scrutiny. The defendant school would be able to overcome the
presumption of gender-based action through contrary evidence in
defense of its dress codes; not every instance of a dress code violation
is direct evidence of gender discrimination. This way, the plaintiffs
can present their full case for discrimination and unduly burdened
rights of free expression in a manner more equitable than is currently
available.
To illustrate how this presumption would function in practice, let
us return to Emma’s discrimination claims. Under California law,
Emma would need to present evidence showing that the tank top ban in
Section 1 of her dress code191 is enforced against female students and
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275–79 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra note 142.
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not against male students. This would satisfy the presumption of
intent. From there, the court could go on to apply strict scrutiny. Even
though strict scrutiny is often viewed as fatal to any law to which it is
applied,192 the school would still have avenues available to it to defeat a
plaintiff’s challenge. Emma’s argument would be that her free
expression rights are violated by the uneven enforcement of a neutrally
written dress code provision.193 Even if the court does apply strict
scrutiny to evaluate the gender discrimination, Emma would still need
to show that her free expression rights were violated. This is still a
difficult case to make, and it is unclear how a court would come down
on this issue until it is actually challenged in practice.
Under federal law, the same challenges would still apply, even
with this proposed presumption. The presumption would allow Emma
to receive intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
school may be able to show that its purposes are sufficiently important
or show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” and that the ban on
tank tops is substantially related to such a purpose. The school may
also succeed in showing that despite any disparate treatment between
the genders, female students like Emma did not actually experience any
impermissible violation of their free expression rights.
This presumption does go against settled jurisprudence for equal
protection cases,194 but the unique nature of these dress code claims
justifies deviation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that
overlapping constitutional issues may allow for a different treatment.195
Employing the presumption described here would more adequately
allow these challenges to receive a full review from the courts, rather
than relegating a complex case such as this to rational basis review,
where it would more than likely die on impact.
This presumption, while helpful to reach a heightened level of
scrutiny, will not guarantee a plaintiff’s victory. It will, however,
allow courts to examine the full discrimination claim against schools
enforcing dress codes unevenly against girls. The hope, in the end, is
not to win case after case, but to push for change to dress codes and

192. See Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658 (2008); supra Part I.B.1.
193. For the facially discriminatory claim against Sections 3 and 4 of the dress code,
strict scrutiny would already be applied, precluding a need for the presumption here. When
strict scrutiny is applied to these provisions, it would serve to eliminate the gender
distinctions in the dress code, leaving Emma to fall back to her free expression claim in this
challenge, as described.
194. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
195. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding an unequal burden on interracial
couples on the fundamental right to marriage); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882 (1990) (leaving open the possibility of heightened scrutiny for “hybrid” claims of free
exercise of religion and another constitutional claim).
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their enforcement. If schools do not have such an easy time defeating
challenges to their dress codes, they would be more likely to change
their practices to avoid costly law suits. In making litigation more
difficult through the use of this presumption and encouraging a change
in school dress codes, the need for the presumption—and indeed, cases
like this in general—can hopefully be eliminated. Just as challenges to
hair length regulations in the 1960s and 1970s have become a thing of
the past thanks to a change in social norms, this presumption can be a
tool through which similar change can occur.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of public schools is to educate. Part of that
educational process involves preparing students for the outside world.
Stifling expression and individuality, and imposing rigid discipline
does more harm than good. Young people will not always have a
school to look out for them and protect them from things that are
different or distracting. It is better to use such distractions as an
opportunity for growth and tolerance. This is especially true in the
case of gender. The body of a young girl is distracting when it is
sexualized—visible shoulders or one more inch of bare leg should not
be viewed as distracting in any way. By calling Emma’s appearance
distracting, the school imposes protectionist views on her and
perpetuates to the rest of the student body that her shoulders and legs
are distracting and should be viewed as such.
It is the sincere hope of this author that more progressive views of
equality and tolerance take hold in the federal and California courts,
paving the way for the elimination of antiquated and sexist views of
female students. School is a place to grow and learn, and students
should not be penalized because of the way society has historically
chosen to treat the clothing they choose to wear. This author hopes that
this examination of the current state of gender discrimination in dress
codes will serve to inspire the much-needed change in the American
public school system.

